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In this article the author will attempt to demonstrate how subcultures that 
lend support to racketeering and terrorist activity in the Catholic and Protestant 
ghettos of Northern Ireland are quite similar to those that sustain criminal 
organizations in North America.1 Over the last 21 years, paramilitary (terrorist) 
organizations have increasingly gained significant control over much of the 
social and economic life of ghettos and, by doing so, have been able to engage 
in types of racketeering that not only exploit the larger community but the very 
people that their leaders claim to be protecting. Believing the rackets to be the 
main source of financing for the paramilitary organizations, Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) (police) officials have wisely reorganized and enlarged 
their Anti-Racketeering Squad. Legislation that was specifically designed to 
control the involvement of the paramilitaries in racketeering has been enacted 
within the last three years. Recent success in curbing some racketeering activity 
can be attributed to the new emphasis that the RUC has placed on controlling this 
type of crime and, to a lesser degree, the recent legislation. However, it is the 
author's contention that the police in Northern Ireland will continue to face 
many of the same obstacles that their North American counterparts do when they 
attempt to bring down criminal organizations that operate within defensive 
subcultures. In addition, as will be explained, the RUC, because of the nature 
of the conflict in Northern Ireland and certain historical traditions, faces a much 
more difficult task when attempting to stamp out the rackets man do North 
American law enforcement agencies. 
The following few pages should provide those readers who know little 
about the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland with some necessary back-
ground information on the paramilitary organizations and their political wings. 
Each of die major organizations will be discussed briefly and references to more 
detailed analyses will be cited in the endnotes. 
THE REPUBLICANS 
After violence between Catholics and Protestants dramatically escalated 
in the streets of Belfast and Deny during 1969, the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), then in a state of disarray, began to reorganize and attempted to 
reestablish its perceived role as the defender of the Catholic people. After a brief 
"honeymoon period" when British troops entered Northern Ireland and were 
generally made to feel welcome by the Catholic population, the IRA began to 




In 1970 internal controversy over such issues as the IRA's decision to 
abandon its traditional abstentionist policy and run candidates for political 
office, its basically Marxist platform, and the level of intensity at which the 
"armed struggle" should be carried out, led to a split within the organization. 
The dissenters formed the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and its political wing 
Provisional Sinn Fein.3 The original organization became known as the Official 
IRA and its political wing as Official Sinn Fein in the south and as Republican 
Clubs in the north. 
Official Sinn Fein/Republican Clubs later became known as Sinn Fein-
The Workers' Party and, in 1983, changed its name again to simply, the 
Workers' Party. Representatives of the ultra left Workers' Party publicly insist 
that its military wing, the OIRA, was disbanded in 1972. While the Officials did 
declare a cease-fire in 1972 and did, in fact, discontinue their guerrilla war 
against the security forces (the RUC and the British Army) there are those, 
including this author, who maintain that the OIRA most certainly still exists and 
is currently a military and fund-raising wing of the Workers' Party. Since 1972, 
when the organization supposedly became defunct, the OIRA has engaged in 
several bloody feuds with the PIRA and the INLA-IRSP, which will be 
discussed shortly. 
While the OIRA is no longer a physical threat to the government, it 
should be at least mentioned in any analysis of racketeering in Northern Ireland. 
The Officials were the ones who started and later perfected such sophisticated 
rackets as tax exemption fraud and have developed some innovative ways of 
laundering illicit funds obtained from numerous other rackets." 
The outlawed Provisional IRA is the largest and most important Re-
publican paramilitary organization. Over the last two decades it has engaged in 
a guerrilla war against the representatives of the existing government and many 
of those whom PIRA leaders regard as being supporters of the government. The 
Provisionals are headed by an Army Council, which maintains control over a 
General Headquarters Staff. The organization has both a northern and southern 
Command. 
Some of the disgruntled members of the IRA who left the organization 
in 1970 and helped form the PIRA did so, in part, because they objected to 
contesting elections and, thus, recognizing the legitimacy of the British state. 
Ironically, since 1981 and before that in the Republic of Ireland, Sinn Fein, the 
PIRA's legal political wing, has run candidates for political office on a regular 
basis. Many of the original dissenters also strongly objected to the IRA's 
Marxist platform. Nevertheless, through the years the PIRA-Sinn Fein has 
progressively developed a leftist orientation with many members now catego-
rizing themselves as "revolutionary socialists."5 
When the OIRA called a cease-fire in 1972, some members who wanted 
to continue the "armed struggle" broke away from the organization and, in 1974, 
founded the Irish Republican Socialist Party and, in 1975, its military wing, the 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). This self-proclaimed Marxist revolu-
tionary organization became less known for its political stance than for the 
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violent activities of some of its seemingly psychopathic leaders, its wanton 
disregard for the lives of innocent civilians, spectacular assassinations of 
political figures, and fierce internal feuding. In 1986-87 the INLA split into two 
factions; the dissenters formed the Irish People's Liberation Organization 
(IPLO). A brutal feud ensued and resulted in the killing or maiming of most of 
those who formerly made up the leadership of the INLA.6 
The INLA is no longer the formidable terrorist organization that it once 
was, and the IPLO, which carried out a number of bombings and assassinations 
during its short history, has recently fallen upon hard times. Within days of this 
writing, IPLO leaders have announced their intention of disbanding the or-
ganization and forming the Irish Republican Resistance Force. Presumably, 
they have been embarrassed by the numerous "outrages" committed by its 
members, the most recent being the gang rape of a young Catholic woman by 
eight IPLO "volunteers." 
THE LOYALISTS 
It is extremely difficult to offer a simple definition of Loyalism and not 
over-simplify some very complex political, as well as military, movements. 
Generally, those who belong to Loyalist political or paramilitary organizations 
are Protestants who want Northern Ireland to remain as part of the United 
Kingdom and are often willing to use all available means of preventing Northern 
Ireland (the north) from becoming united with the Republic of Ireland (the 
south) under one government. However, while no Loyalist would be willing to 
tolerate a United Ireland, some do not insist that the province must remain as an 
integral part of the U.K. For example, in 1979 the leadership of the largest 
Loyalist paramilitary organization, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), 
advocated the establishment of an "Independent Ulster" that would be closely 
linked to the U.K. in terms of trade relations but would be, more or less, 
politically and administratively autonomous. 
When the UDA was established in 1971, many joined its ranks because 
they believed it to be a necessary defense organization that would serve to 
protect the working class Protestant population from a ruthless IRA. However, 
the UDA has increasingly become known as more of a terrorist and/or racket-
eering organization than as a legitimate defense association. While the UDA is 
organized along military lines similar to that of the PIRA, UDA spokesmen 
usually do not, as the Provisionals do, take credit for assassinations and other 
forms of political violence. However, those who claim to belong to the branch 
of the UDA known as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) proudly acknowledge 
their involvement in violent actions against their perceived enemies who are 
primarily members of Republican paramilitaries and their supporters. Mem-
bership in the UFF is prohibited by law, but the UDA itself remains a legal 
organization. Few believe that the UFF actually exists as an organization. Most 
experts agree that the men who make up the UFF murder squads are, in fact, 
regular members of the UDA. By not claiming direct involvement in terrorist 
activity, the UDA has, thus far, avoided being proscribed by law. 
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Throughout most of its history, the UDA has managed to confuse many 
of those who live in the north by continuing to put forth seemingly contradictory 
policy statements and by engaging in behavior that does not coincide with its 
publicly avowed goals. For example, the UDA has engaged in apparently 
sincere negotiations with the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), the 
largest Catholic political party in the north, and has instructed its members to 
avoid conflict with Catholics. At the same time, however, UDA men, under the 
banner of the UFF, have tortured and murdered innocent Catholics, burned out 
Catholic churches, and assassinated Catholic political rivals. Quite surprisingly, 
the UDA policy document, Common Sense, that was published in 1987 demon-
strated a considerable degree of sensitivity to the needs of the Catholic minority. 
On the other hand, not so surprisingly, much of the material contained in the 
UDA's regularly-published magazine, Ulster, is rooted in anti-Catholic bigotry 
and ignorance. 
The other major Loyalist paramilitary organization is the outlawed 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). This organization claims to trace its roots back 
to the 1914 UVF, which was established for the purpose of opposing Irish Home 
Rule and which later distinguished itself as part of the British Army—the 36th 
(Ulster) Division — in World War I. However, the current UVF, which was 
organized in the late 1960s to fight against the IRA, has little in common with 
the original organization. While the UVF can boast of a few military accom-
plishments, such as a 1989 direct hit on Sinn Fein headquarters in the Catholic 
ghetto of Ardoyne with a RPG-7 rocket, it is most widely known for engaging 
in brutal sectarian killings and its inability to maintain internal discipline. 
Several of the minor Loyalist terrorist groups such as the Red Hand Commando, 
which has been generally inactive in recent years, and the Protestant Action 
Force are commonly believed to be only factions within the UVF or cover names 
used by UVF members when they carry out some particularly outrageous act of 
violence.7 
THE EARLY RACKETS AND A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY 
The paramilitary organizations that have been involved in the "armed 
struggle" during the last 21 years have, since the very beginning, been willing 
to engage in both ordinary crime and racketeering for the purpose of financing 
their military and political campaigns. Their participation in such activity 
distinguishes them from their historical predecessors. Journalist Martin Dillon 
correctly observes that members of the "old" IRA who engaged in ordinary 
crime, such as bank robberies, risked being ostracized by their fellow revolu-
tionaries. "The attitude that robbery was anathema to Republicans remained in 
place until the commencement of the 'dirty war' in 1969".8 
From the start of the current phase of the conflict in 1969, some types of 
ordinary criminal behavior were legitimized by both Republican and Loyalist 
paramilitary leaders. By sanctioning such activity, the organizations were then 
able to become involved in racketeering, and, ultimately, to develop and 
maintain significant social and economic control of the ghettos. When PIRA 
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leaders, as Dillon points out, first constructed barricades and established "no-
go" areas (neighborhoods that were under the protection and control of the IRA 
and in which, for a time, security forces were unable to enter) they soon 
discovered that they had marked off territories in which they could operate 
criminal enterprises with impunity. 
The first lucrative racket that the Republicans developed involved the 
exploitation of the brewing industry. Brewery executives negotiated deals with 
paramilitary leaders that resulted in the delivery of alcoholic beverages to some 
establishments within the "no-go" areas. Illegal drinking clubs known as 
"shabeens" replaced the pubs and clubs that were destroyed during the rioting 
that took place in the ghettos in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The organiza-
tions not only maintained control over the "shabeens" but developed increas-
ingly sophisticated relationships with the breweries. Dillon claims that in 1969-
70 a leading Provisional IRA man was placed on the payroll of one brewery and 
an accountant representing the PIRA was appointed to negotiate the prices for 
all of the alcoholic beverages sold to "IRA controlled outlets."9 Loyalist 
paramilitaries soon established their own working relationships with brewer-
ies.10 
Paddy Devlin, a highly respected political commentator and former 
chief whip of the SDLP, in an interview with Dillon, explained how the 
establishment of the early barricades was "critical" in the development of the 
rackets. By physically, socially, and, to a degree, economically isolating their 
communities the racketeers/terrorists were, he contends, able to establish 
criminal empires. 
"The barricades brought an influx of criminal and low-life types 
into so-called defense organizations which evolved into the 
Provisional IRA. It was a tribal thing which brought monies, 
even state monies from government agencies in Dublin, into the 
North for Catholic aid They (the area leaders) evolved into the 
Godfathers who sustained their own existence and position with 
funds generated on the same basis as the New York Mafia 
families."11 
Devlin was a member of the IRA in the early 1950s and, during the early 
stages of the current "troubles", was active in the Central Citizens Defense 
Committee. He was, thus, in an ideal position to observe the development of the 
rackets on a daily basis. It is not only important to draw the reader's attention 
to the conclusions that Devlin comes to, but also the terminology that he uses. 
He labels those who were to become PIRA leaders as "Godfathers" and points 
to the similarities between their organization and "New York Mafia families." 
Academics who use such terms when discussing the paramilitaries 
naturally invite criticism from their colleagues. It is argued that those who use 
such terms as "racketeer," "gangster," "Godfather," and "Mafia" are adopting 
an "elitist" position and, by doing so, tend to ignore the transgressions of the 
legal authorities. This only serves to further the government's interest in 
criminalizing behavior, so the argument goes, that is no worse than that engaged 
29 
Fall 1990 
in by the security forces. Critics also claim that such words are often used by 
representatives of the British government for propaganda purposes. It is to the 
advantage of the government if the Republican paramilitary organizations are 
seen as self-serving mafias. Such criticism may be, to a degree, justified if it is 
not carried too far. Government officials and both British and Irish journalists 
have, indeed, used such terminology and have claimed that Republican para-
military leaders behave more like gangsters than they do revolutionaries. 
Nevertheless, at the risk of offending some, such words will appear again in the 
remainder of the text. 
It is significant that many long-time Irish "nationalists", such as Paddy 
Devlin, and even some die-hard Republicans not only use such words, but equate 
the Republican paramilitaries with "the Mafia." Such an analogy represents 
their perception of reality. To ignore that perception and its associated 
terminology would distort a particular view of the paramilitary organizations 
that is held by many, including some who, like Devlin, are considered to be 
"insiders." Equally important, the victims also tend to use the same terminology, 
and view the organizations as being analogous to mafias. However, other 
sources within the ghettos of Belfast and Deny do not all speak with the same 
voice on the subject of racketeering. On one extreme, for example, some 
contend that the PIRA remains ideologically pure and does not exploit ordinary 
citizens. On the other, some see all of the Provos as gangsters and hoodlums who 
are intent only on gaining power and money. It also should be made clear that 
racketeering would probably not be near the top of a list of concerns expressed 
by residents of the ghettos. Most are content not knowing much about such 
activity, and most of those who do are not inclined to speak out on the subject. 
However, if one is to meaningfully discuss the financing of terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, one must certainly use such words as racketeering and mafia 
because these terms are used by, and accurately describe the perceptions held by, 
key individuals, including disgruntled Republicans and Loyalists as well as 
victims. These are the very people who know the most about the subject and who 
can at least begin to help us understand the subcultural obstacles to the control 
of racketeering and terrorism. 
RACKETEERING TODAY 
AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
Republican paramilitary organizations are engaged in what they regard 
as a guerrilla war against the security forces and operate militarily out of certain 
"working class" Catholic neighborhoods. It should come as no surprise to learn, 
therefore, that they maintain tight control over much of the social and financial 
life of their communities. Anything that is perceived of as a threat to the social 
control that the paramilitary bosses maintain over the community (such as 
independent social and drinking establishments) or to their business empire 
(such as a bus system in the neighborhoods that would compete with the PIRA-
controlled taxi companies) either sells out, moves out, or is blown up. 
While in recent years the Loyalist organizations have engaged in serious 
confrontations with the RUC, they are not involved in a shooting war with the 
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security forces. The police are able, therefore, to operate more freely in the 
Protestant "working class" areas and, as a result, Loyalist "supremos" are more 
vulnerable than are their Republican counterparts. Nevertheless, the UDA and 
UVF, often employing even more brutal forms of intimidation than those used 
by Republicans, also attempt to maintain tight reins on the economic and social 
life of their communities. Their success in doing so should not be underestimated. 
As a result of the passage in March 1989 of the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act the police now have the legal authority to examine 
bank accounts and seize funds that are linked to paramilitary organizations.12 
This legislation was patterned on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO) in the United States.13 The RICO type statute, which 
was supported by all of the political parties except the political wings of the 
paramilitaries, holds promise of future victories for the RUC in its fight against 
racketeering. Thus far, the legislation has not actually been used to seize 
paramilitary funds. However, a law enacted in January 1988 (Emergency 
Provision of die Northern Ireland Act) has already proven to be an extremely 
valuable tool for the RUC in its attempt to eradicate Loyalist extortion rackets. 
Through the establishment of private security firms, factions within the 
UDA were able to maintain the appearance of legitimacy when receiving 
payments from building site contractors and other businessmen. The UDA 
would, in fact, provide a minimal amount of security, usually a watchman and 
sometimes security dogs, but businessmen either paid off these UDA-front 
organizations or, at die very least, their property would be destroyed. There 
never was any question about who was behind the extortion rackets. In fact, the 
number listed for one of the security firms in the yellow pages of the telephone 
book was actually mat of UDA headquarters. The UDA ran extortion rackets 
in all Loyalist areas and even in some Republican territory, such as the Short 
Strand, where the Official IRA maintains a strong presence. There is little 
question mat the OIRA and the UDA worked out a cooperative arrangement in 
which the Officials operated die tax exemption fraud racket on the building sites 
and me UDA provided the security.14 
The 1988 legislation referred to above requires all private security firms 
to be licensed by the Secretary of State. The name of every employee of the firm 
must be declared and after an application is approved, a registration fee is 
assessed. While it would be naive to suggest that extortion no longer takes place 
on building sites in Loyalist areas, virtually all of the UDA-controlled security 
firms have gone out of business. 
The effects of die most recent legislation that was specifically designed 
to cope with the racketeering problem has been, perhaps, a litüe disappointing. 
In recent years, however, a few courageous men have taken stands against the 
paramilitary-backed gangsters. Their willingness to do so has brought forth 
some encouraging results. In 1986, Jim Murtagh, a Catholic pub owner, was me 
first to challenge the authority of the racketeers and is, indeed, the bravest of me 
brave few who have risked their lives by doing so. As a result of Murtagh's 




A few other brave individuals have followed Murtagh's example and 
have testified in court against paramilitary extortionists. The most noteworthy 
case is a recent one in which building industry officials gave evidence against 
five members of the UDA who were demanding protection money from them. 
They, as Murtagh was, were wired for sound when meeting with the terrorists. 
Their testimony and the taped evidence that was played in court resulted in the 
conviction and imprisonment of the five high-echelon UDA men, including a 
man by the name of Artie Fee, one of the most notorious of the Loyalist 
gangsters. As a result of this and a few other recent trials, as well as some 
ongoing investigations by the RUC, Loyalist paramilitary organizations are 
currently in a state of disarray. Most of the old leadership of both the UDA and 
the UVF are now in prison, many after having been convicted on racketeering 
charges. 
Certainly the demise of one James Craig, a close associate of Fee and 
arguably the most feared gangster in Northern Ireland, has caused building 
contractors and other business people to breathe a little more easily. The one-
time UDA supremo was gunned down by a UFF hit squad. Craig's blatant 
gangsterism had become an embarrassment to the UDA leadership. He was one 
of a number of flamboyant Loyalists, who, unlike their Republican counterparts, 
behaved much like the stereotypical rich and flashy North American gangster. 
Craig was also blamed for the murder of UDA kingpin, John McMichael, a 
leader who had expressed a desire to investigate racketeering within the UDA. 
Allegedly, Craig made arrangements with the PIRA to have McMichael killed.15 
As strange as it may seem, Loyalists and Republicans do sometimes enter into 
agreements which may involve one side carrying out assassinations for the other 
or dividing up territory for racketeering purposes, as noted earlier. Regardless 
of the circumstances surrounding Craig's assassination, his death and recent 
successful investigations by the RUC have apparently brought about a decrease 
in some of the more visible types of racketeering activity. 
Racketeering on the Republican side is much more sophisticated and 
professionally run than it is in Loyalist areas. The RUC may know that both the 
PIRA-Sinn Fein and the OIRA- Workers' Party are, for example, operating their 
social and drinking clubs illegally, but proving this to be the case is extremely 
difficult. Club managers may claim to pay as much as 50,000 pounds in wages 
above what they are actually paying, make 100,000 on beer and spirits in excess 
of what they are reporting, and siphon off nearly 100,000 pounds in profits from 
gaming machines. Nevertheless, the police have been able, in a few instances, 
to close down these lucrative sources of financing for the paramilitaries. The 
1987 Registration of Clubs Act gave the RUC the authority to examine the 
accounts of the various clubs and to shut down those who could not provide 
documentation that proves they are legally run establishments. Since January 
of this year, the courts have mandated the closing of five Republican and one 
Loyalist club. 
Investigators know very well that certain social and drinking clubs, the 
West Belfast Taxi Association, and a number of other business establishments 
are front organizations for the Provisional IRA. In fact, there are few people in 
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Belfast, if any, who do not know that the West Belfast Taxi Association, as well 
as some other taxi companies, are controlled by the PIRA. PIRA-Sinn Fein 
spokesmen, at least most of those that this writer has encountered, do not even 
deny this. However, knowing which businesses are front organizations for the 
paramilitaries is not enough. Authorities are faced with the difficult task of 
tracing the money made by such organizations to the financing of terrorist 
activity. With such evidence, prosecution is difficult, if not impossible. 
The PIRA's taxi business is self-contained, sophisticated, and, at least on 
the surface, appears to operate legally. Of course, bombing and intimidating the 
competition out of business, as the Provos have done, and using the proceeds 
from their operation to finance their military campaign could hardly be regarded 
as lawful behavior. Nevertheless, the PIRA taxi racket is a well-run enterprise 
in which the drivers must purchase their fuel, maintenance, and insurance from 
the organization itself, and pay their dues at the Sinn Fein offices at Conway 
Street Mills on a regular basis. The whole operation is covered by a private 
insurance policy which the taxi association takes out with Lloyds. 
On the Loyalist side, the UDA and UVF also demand and get regular 
payments from the drivers of black taxis in the Protestant ghetto areas. Unlike 
their Republican counterparts, however, the Loyalist taxi rackets are not very 
sophisticated. Protestant drivers must pay their dues to the paramilitaries, but 
they purchase their fuel, maintenance, and insurance from private outlets. 
RUC officers, who are constantly targeted for assassinations, can hardly 
be expected to conduct investigations of either street or organized crime in 
Republican ("hard green") areas in the same manner in which police do in 
"normal" neighborhoods. Northern Ireland has been determined to be the most 
dangerous place in the world in which to do police work.16 The mere fact that 
the RUC can point to a number of successful investigations involving racketeer-
ing activity linked to the Republican paramilitaries is not only a testimony to the 
professionalism of its officers but to their bravery. 
The situation is even more precarious for the RUC when they are on duty 
in Republican strongholds in the border areas. Now in possession of advanced 
military hardware, the PIRA is such a threat to the security forces in the rural 
border areas that simply patrolling this so-called "bandit" or "Indian" territory 
is a significant accomplishment. It is here, in these PIRA and INLA controlled 
areas, where vast sums are made from smuggling, exacting tribute from 
legitimate truckers who transport goods of all sorts across the border, and from 
the red diesel racket.17 Elaborating on the obvious serves little purpose. Obvi-
ously, investigating racketeering activity that takes place within what amounts 
to enemy territory is dangerous, frustrating, and seldom rewarded with success. 
The main purpose of this article is to examine some of the social 
relationships that have developed and are maintained within the closed ghetto 
subcultures that exist in Northern Ireland and analyze the implications that they 
have for the control of racketeering. The new legislation and the increasing 
attention that the RUC is giving to the financing of terrorism should result in a 
decrease in some racketeering activity. However, the social organization that 
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exists within the ghettos and offers protection to the racketeer and terrorist 
remains intact and, if anything, is becoming more solidified. Only by examining 
the social organization of the ghetto can one discover the main obstacles to the 
control of both racketeering and terrorism. 
GHETTO ATTITUDE 
The lower class urban neighborhoods of Northern Ireland that are 
populated predominantly by people from one religious and cultural tradition 
(Catholics or Protestants) will, for the purpose of this article, be referred to as 
ghettos. It is important to note that the word ghetto has a different meaning from 
that of the word slum and the social disorganization and physical deterioration 
that the word slum implies. A ghetto, in fact, may also be a slum, but in the 
Northern Ireland context the ghetto simply means an area of lower class ethnic 
and religious concentration. The police often refer to such neighborhoods as 
either "hard green" (Republican) or "hard orange" (Loyalist) areas. 
The importance of the social class factor should also be emphasized 
because the paramilitaries primarily operate out of, have the most influence in, 
and receive the most support from the lower class neighborhoods. For example, 
in Deny the PIRA's stronghold is in the public housing projects (estates) in the 
Catholic Bogside. However, the Catholic middle class area of Foyle Springs is 
relatively untouched by the PIRA's influence and, therefore, is of little concern 
to the RUC in its attempts to combat terrorism and racketeering. In Northern 
Ireland, those living in public housing projects are often referred to as the 
working class. However, considering the excessively high unemployment rates 
in these areas, it hardly seems appropriate to label them as such. 
The difficulties that those working within the criminal justice system 
face when attempting to control terrorism and/or racketeering can be fully 
appreciated only after clear explanation of some basic truths about the social 
organization of the ghetto and the socialization process that many of its 
inhabitants experience. As is true of many who grow up within the North 
American urban subcultures that produce organized crime figures, many of 
Northern Ireland's youngsters are the products of a socialization process that 
instills in them values alien to those of the larger society and its laws, which lead 
to behavior that outsiders may consider outrageous. It is probably not wise to 
read too much into the extreme opinions one hears voiced by some ghetto youth 
in Northern Ireland or, for that matter, in New York or Los Angeles. However, 
one does not have to interview many young Catholic or Protestant residents of 
the ghettos of Belfast to come up with examples of individuals who attribute no 
legitimacy to the values deemed important by most who live outside the ghettos, 
and who actually approve of behavior that is shocking by most standards. 
During a conversation that the author had with several young men in Turf 
Lodge, a Catholic Ghetto in Belfast, I asked them if there was any one individual 
who they admired more than anyone else. '"Mad Dog' McGlinchey" was the 
reply. The ruthless Dominic McGlinchey was the former Chief of Staff of the 
INLA. The young men were particularly impressed by McGlinchey's "volun-
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teers" when they machine-gunned Protestant fundamentalists as they prayed in 
Church at Darkley, in November 1983.18 The young men did not seem to harbor 
strong dislikes for Protestants or have any real interest in the Republican 
movement. In the words of one, the massacre was just "a good thing to do." 
On the other side of the divide, Michael "Rambo" Stone is a new folk 
hero to some of the Protestants who live in the Shankill Road area of Belfast. The 
Catholic-born Stone, whose views were so extreme that he was even rejected for 
membership by some Loyalist paramilitary organizations, will be remembered 
for his one man attack on a Republican funeral in 1988 during which he killed 
several mourners. 
Of course, the actions of such men as McGlinchey and Stone are 
considered outrageous by most of those who live in the ghettos and even by 
many, if not most, who are active within the paramilitaries. However, the 
viewpoints expressed by McGlinchey and Stone supporters are not so uncom-
mon that they would be considered abnormal. They have, undoubtedly, been 
developed through social interaction within the immediate environments of 
those who hold them and do not stem from individual pathology. What is, 
perhaps, more alarming is the insensitivity to human suffering, often their own, 
that is evident in many ghetto youth. The author asked another Turf Lodge youth 
to express his opinion about the Enniskillen bombing in which 11 Protestants 
were killed and numerous others were maimed by a PIRA-planted bomb while 
they were attending memorial services. In his opinion, was it morally wrong to 
take these innocent lives? When asked, he thought for a moment and replied, 
"Ya, I guess it was, but fuck 'em." This young man had no love for the Provos, 
having been beaten in the past by PIRA punishment squads, and claimed that he 
really did not have anything against Protestants, although he seemed to regard 
fighting with them at soccer matches to be his primary mission in life. It goes 
without saying that such hard men and women who either support or are 
indifferent to the worst forms of violence can hardly be expected to concern 
themselves about racketeering activity within their neighborhoods. 
Of course, it should come as no surprise to learn that a disproportionate 
number of ghetto inhabitants, in comparison with those who live in more stable 
societies, appear to be insensitive to human suffering and regard violence as a 
viable means of expressing themselves. When lower class Catholics and 
Protestants feel that they are being discriminated against, are constantly being 
subjected to propaganda and outright intimidation by various organizations, and 
live in the midst of a war that has taken a psychological and/or physical toll on 
most of their friends and relatives, they can hardly be expected to think and act 
like "normal" people. The fact that many, if not most do, act like "normal" 
people, is a tribute to those ghetto parents, clergy, and teachers who do their best 
to instill proper values in their children and work to ensure that they will stay out 
of trouble. 
This authorand others have written elsewhere abouthow the paramilitaries 
and their political wings influence the social, economic, and political life of the 
ghetto and, to a large degree, control the inhabitants' access to information, 
community services, and sometimes even jobs and welfare benefits.19 By 
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denying assistance to non-supporters and socially ostracizing if not physically 
punishing those who speak out against them, they are able to maintain signifi-
cant control over the ghettos and engage in racketeering activity that not only 
exploits the larger community but the very people that they claim to be 
protecting. The paramilitaries are able to maintain control over their 
neighborhoods because they enjoy a significant degree of support from ghetto 
residents and because they are such physically intimidating forces. 
Examples of how and why PIRA-Sinn Fein has managed to cultivate and 
maintain a degree of community support will be provided shortly. Before doing 
so, however, the reader's attention must be drawn to the second point made 
earlier: without using their power to physically intimidate the ghetto populations, 
the PIRA and other paramilitary organizations could not develop and maintain 
their racketeering empires. A friend of the author from the Catholic Short Strand 
spoke for many when he angrily explained what the PIRA meant to him. 
They're all scum bags—banging the same tune. They're street 
bullies. Like the class bully in school—you can hit everybody 
in class but don't hit him. Say something bad about everybody 
in class but don't say anything bad about him. They (those who 
live in the Catholic ghettos) don't like the Provies. For 20 years 
those fuckers have been walking in and out of their homes, taking 
their cars, telling them when to work, telling them when not to 
work. I could teach you a lot about guys that have been killed— 
crippled by the IRA—fucked up by the IRA—. 
He went on to provide numerous examples of the PIRA's bullying tactics 
and of how people he knew were killed or maimed because of real, imagined or 
made up offenses against the Republican movement or because individual 
Provos used their affiliations with the organization to settle personal scores. A 
one-time high ranking member of the PIRA has, over the last few years, provided 
the author with some valuable information about his former organization. He 
probably would not disagree with much that was said by the above informant. 
When asked about the level of support for the Provisionals within the Catholic 
ghettos, replied: "Ninety seven percent wouldn't support the Provos—actually 
support them. I mean they stand in a pub or a bar and tell ye the Provos are great 
but to actually do something—to mind guns or mind explosives or let them use 
their homes or use their care—no." It is natural and apparently logical to as-
sume that when a person casts a vote for Sinn Fein, he or she is also voting for 
the PIRA. But, that is not necessarily the case, according to this former Provo. 
I mean, they vote Sinn Fein because they don't see any other 
option. A lot of people see the IRA as their protectors if it came 
to a civil war, but that is all ! If they felt safe enough they would 
criticize the IRA. Most people would absolutely criticize the 
IRA because the IRA has crossed most people in one way or 
another. An awful lot of people have been shot in the knees and 
beat up. Everybody has been touched. It amazes me the (low) 
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level of support that they have and manage to carry on— 
certainly in Belfast. The like of Crossmagien—I'm not sure. 
The most recent Ulster Marketing Survey poll lends support to the above 
contention that Sinn Fein voters do not necessarily back the PIRA. As reported 
in Fortnight magazine: "One out of every five Sinn Fein voters disagrees with 
the use of violence to achieve political ends, and one in three believes Sinn Fein 
should renounce the armed campaign of the IRA—contradicting the widely 
accepted assumption that a vote for Sinn Fein is merely a vote for the gunman".20 
The same poll indicates that fully one third of Sinn Fein voters are unemployed 
and those who are employed "are heavily concentrated among manual and semi-
skilled social groups." Interestingly, the (SDLP), Sinn Fein's chief rival for 
votes within the Catholic community and a strong advocate of non-violent 
politics, has a 13% unemployment rate among its voters. This is lower than the 
rate for the population as a whole.21 Evidently, in the minds of many unemployed 
or semi-skilled Catholic ghetto residents, Sinn Fein may have its drawbacks, but 
it is the only party that comes close to representing them; the SDLP, from their 
perspective, is primarily a middle class Catholic party. 
Few ordinary men and women openly criticize the Republican paramili-
tary organizations. There are too many "sympathizers" around for one to feel 
safe doing so. Also, it is essential not to neglect the fact that the paramilitaries 
are stable organizations that have the backing of numerous hard-core supporters. 
The next section will focus on the similarities between paramilitary organiza-
tions in Northern Ireland and criminal organizations in North America and how 
such organizations develop and maintain stability and support. 
NORTH AMERICAN AND IRISH GHETTOS: A COMPARISON 
Some American criminologists claim that there are certain types of 
subcultures that develop within some urban neighborhoods which produce 
individuals who enter into and are successful in organized crime (racketeering). 
Other types of subcultures do not provide youngsters with opportunities to enter 
into sophisticated criminal activity and, therefore, produce only street corner 
gangs and petty criminals or drug addicts and other dropouts. What Cloward and 
Ohlin22 describe as "criminal" subcultures, as opposed to "conflict"23 and 
"retreatest"24 subcultures, are characterized by two factors. This first is an 
"integration of age levels"; adult criminals become role models to youngsters 
and often teach them the finer techniques of crime and/or recruit them into 
criminal organizations. The second factor is contact and working relationships 
with those in the "semi-legitimate world", including lawyers who specialize in 
"mob cases", bondsmen, fences, and corrupt police officers. An established 
racketeering organization provides neighborhood youngsters who demonstrate 
potential with opportunities to serve apprenticeships and eventually be recruited 
into the organization, thus assuring the continuing existence of the organization 
through the infusion of new blood. 
Robert Merton hypothesizes that lower class American youth turn to 
crime largely because they cannot obtain their "culturally defined goals" 
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(material success, the desire for which, he contends, most people in American 
society, regardless of social class, internalize to some degree). They cannot 
obtain their goals because, living in lower class neighborhoods, they do not have 
the "institutionalized means" (access to jobs and educational opportunities) to 
obtain legitimate success. Therefore, they often attempt to obtain their "cultur-
ally defined goals" through "illegitimate means" or, in other words, involvement 
in criminal activity. 
Cloward and Ohlin claim that some urban subcultures, such as the 
"conflict" one, do not provide opportunities to obtain either legitimate or 
illegitimate success. Thus, individuals living in "conflict" subcultures have 
little chance of becoming accomplished criminals. However, while those who 
grow up in "criminal" subcultures may find it difficult to succeed in the 
legitimate business world, they do have opportunities to become successful 
illegitimately as organized crime figures. 
Some scholars disagree with Cloward and Ohlin's theory, maintaining 
that it is oversimplified and that the pure "criminal" subcultures, in which life 
revolves around organized criminal activity, can seldom, if ever, be found. 
Nevertheless, research does confirm Cloward and Ohlin's basic contention that 
a certain type of subculture provides individuals with opportunities to succeed 
in careers in organized crime while other types of subcultures simply do not.25 
Even in some neighborhoods where distinct "criminal" subcultures cannot be 
found, "criminal" gangs or cliques often provide youngsters with opportunities 
to succeed in organized crime.26 
The theories that have developed from criminological research in the 
United States may help us to understand how the defensive subcultures that are 
so apparent within the ghettos of Belfast and Deny have presented and will 
continue to present barriers to the control of terrorism and racketeering. In fact, 
it can be persuasively argued that researchers are more likely to find Cloward 
andOhlin'spure "criminal" subcultures withincertainneighborhoodsinNorthern 
Ireland than within modern North American cities. Most social scientists agree 
that suburbanization and the demise of machine politics resulted in the break-
down of the solid urban subcultures in North America that sustained both 
criminal and political organizations during the first half of the century. Cir-
cumstances have been quite different in Northern Ireland over the last 21 years. 
Since the "Troubles" broke out in 1968 thousands of Catholics and Protestants 
who formerly lived in at least partially integrated lower class neighborhoods 
have, as a result of fear and intimidation, found refuge in the ghettos or, as the 
Northern Irish sociologist John Darby would say, retreated to the "heartlands."27 
For two decades now residents of the ghettos have become participants in 
defensive subcultures in which they often come under the influence of the 
dominant political and criminal forces in their immediate environments. 
In the Addams section of Chicago and on Mulberry Street in New York 
City, children who are deemed to have potential have opportunities to run 
errands for, observe, and in other ways interact with powerful men who accept 
crime as a way of life. Like the young males growing up in these Italian-
American neighborhoods, children in the Catholic and Protestant ghettos of 
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Belfast and Deny serve apprenticeships to individuals who have rejected many 
of die norms and laws of the larger society ("integration of age levels"). If 
anything, the role models for ghetto children in Northern Ireland are even more 
likely to demonstrate a commitment to violence, through words and example, 
and to completely deny the legitimacy of the law and existing criminal justice 
system than are their American counterparts. In Cloward and Ohlin's terms, the 
ghetto subcultures may not provide adequate means to succeed along legitimate 
lines, but they do provide some youngsters with opportunities to succeed 
illegitimately. 
In the early 1970s the Provisionals developed a quite formal method 
indoctrinating ghetto youth. Through participation in a kind of PIRA minor 
league, Na Fianna Eireann, youngsters were not only subjected to Republican 
propaganda but actually received military training and carried out some assign-
ments. The author has had the opportunity to observe the more subtle ways in 
which Sinn Fein-PIRA is currently attempting to win the hearts and minds of 
ghetto youth. These observations took place in and around recreation centers in 
Republican neighborhoods, particularly in Twinbrook. 
To fully understand the extent of the influence that the paramilitaries and 
their political wings have over ghetto youth, it is necessary to provide some 
background information on the probation and social service programs that are 
available to boys and girls who live in these areas. Probation officers and social 
workers can only serve the youth of the Catholic and Protestant ghettos if they 
have the consent of the dominant paramilitaries in these areas. Therefore, 
representatives of social service agencies must convince Sinn Fein, as well as the 
UDA that they are politically neutral before they are allowed to operate within 
Republican or Loyalist controlled neighborhoods. In some instances, in order 
to be allowed to serve area youth, agencies have actually hired Sinn Fein and 
UDA activists as what amounts to be youth counselors.28 As a result many 
youngsters come under the direct influence of the paramilitaries, or their 
political wings, through tiieir participation in government-financed programs. 
The author's observations allow him to conclude that Sinn Fein repre-
sentatives are becoming increasingly successful in converting ghetto youngsters 
to their way of thinking. Sinn Fein's current efforts seem to be concentrated on 
winning over young delinquents, aged 12 to 15, before they enter into the ranks 
of the "Hoods", semi-organized groups of street hoodlums. Sinn Fein, in the 
author's opinion, views the Hoods as threats to its control of such ghettos as 
Twinbrook. Therefore, Sinn Fein leaders from Gerry Adams (the president of 
Sinn Fein) on down, are prepared to spend considerable time and effort in selling 
Republicanism to the very young. They are doing so by holding out the promise 
to diese youngsters of attaining real success within the Republican movement. 
The author has spent a considerable amount of time with a well-known 
Sinn Fein Counselor who is employed by a youth program in Twinbrook and has 
studied his interaction with young people in the neighborhood. Some regard this 
man as being nothing other than a crude and dangerous thug. However, in the 
eyes of the youngsters who participate in the government-sponsored youth 
program that employs him, he is nothing less than a god. Former common street 
39 
Fall 1990 
delinquents, under his guidance, have been converted into Republican sympa-
thizers who see the Sinn Fein man, and others like him, as representing their only 
hope for the future and the "armed struggle" as the only solution to Northern 
Ireland's problems. 
The author was particularly struck by the comments made by three boys 
selling the An PhoblachtlRepublicanNews (Sinn Fein-PIRA's newspaper) when 
he first met them in Twinbrook. All of them were probationers who participated 
in the Sinn Fein Counselor's youth program. The kids seemingly could not wait 
to present a copy of the latest edition to their hero and, when they thought that 
"the outsider" was not looking, to slip him a note. In much the same way that 
youngsters in certain neighborhoods in North America identify with "wiseguys", 
the Twinbrook newsboys were sharing secrets with an important person, and 
that made them feel important too. They had been given roles to play in a cause 
and that was more than they had ever been given before. 
Observing how they hung on the Counselor's every word, it was 
somewhat surprising to learn, after interviewing the youngsters, that none of 
them could really articulate Sinn Fein's political philosophy. They certainly did 
not engage in the same kind of Marxist sloganeering that their mentor did when 
the author talked to him privately.29 Sinn Fein representatives appear to be 
clever enough not to engage in blatant forms of brainwashing. Most parents, 
particularly mothers, would strenuously object, even if they feared the PIRA, if 
they thought that their children were being subjected to extreme indoctrination 
techniques. As it was, all of the youngsters admitted that their parents would be 
very upset if they knew about their close relationships with the Sinn Fein man. 
While the newsboys had not been schooled in Sinn Fein's particular 
brand of Marxist revolutionary ideology and knew next to nothing about world 
affairs, Sinn Fein had, through the efforts of the Counselor and another Sinn Fein 
activist who is a school teacher, managed to direct the youngsters' existing 
prejudices, hatreds, and frustrations toward nearly all other organizations and 
individuals that touched their lives. They had become paranoid to the point that 
they believed that all, save Sinn Fein-PIRA, were oppressing them. They 
disliked America ("The only good things about America is NORATD"), but all 
wanted to visit the United States and hoped that the author could help them do 
so. All of the major political parties, they had learned, supported the hated 
British government. Even the nationalist SDLP was "pro Brit." With some 
justification, they viewed other radical and/or Republican organizations as their 
enemies. To them, the Workers' Party was the OIRA who were nothing but 
gangsters and bullies. The INLA was simply written off as a contingent of 
Hoods. They did not hate Protestants in general, they said, but they were 
convinced that Protestants despised them. 
These, in many ways likable, youngsters have been successfully con-
verted by Sinn Fein-PIRA, ironically with the help of the British government, 
and within the next few years may very well join the ranks of the men behind the 
gun. They have already accepted the belief in the necessity of using torture, 




The former high ranking Provo quoted above admitted that he had stayed 
in the organization as long as he did because of the sense of power that he felt 
as a result of his position in the ghetto community. He believes that others do 
so for the same reason. He might have belonged to a "secret army," but his 
connection to the PIRA was no secret to many in the community. Admirers ran 
errands for him, patted him on the back and praised him and, while he now knows 
that people probably feared him more than they respected him, being feared was 
good enough for him. 
The Twinbrook newsboys, most likely, will soon be given a gift that only 
the paramilitaries are able to offer them, psychological and physical power over 
others. It is doubtful if any of these kids, as individuals, would have the courage 
or the ability to take on some of the genuine Hoods in the community. Contrary 
to popular opinion, the young Provos are not necessarily the toughest guys on 
the block. However, backed by a powerful and ruthless organization, and 
working in teams, young "volunteers" make up PIRA punishment squads and 
hand out beatings and kneecappings to many Hoods who would be more than 
matches for them in one to one combat. 
Individuals who appear willing to engage in the worst forms of violent 
activity can hardly be expected to have any moral qualms about racketeering. In 
fact the Twinbrook boys attached no particular meaning to the word. When they 
get older they may learn to use such words as "revolutionary expropriations." 
However, right now they simply accept as justifiable whatever means of making 
money that the PIRA must use in order to finance the cause. Some might contend 
that Sinn Fein-PIRA applies at least psychological pressure on ghetto residents 
when soliciting contributions. However, to the youngsters, far from engaging 
in extortion, the organization is just collecting the "tax." If you do not pay the 
"tax", the boys were quick to point out, you will not receive assistance from Sinn 
Fein when you need it. Unlike their Sinn Fein mentor, who insisted that he was 
willing to help all members of the community regardless of their political 
affiliations, the youngsters pointed out that assistance only goes to the faithful, 
and that is the way it should be. 
DEFENSIVE SUBCULTURES: OBSTACLES TO CRIME CONTROL 
Current research continues to confirm what has been known for some 
time about delinquent behavior. While intervention on the part of law enforce-
ment or social service agencies does little to reduce one's commitment to a 
criminal career, the aging process does tend to decrease the intensity and 
duration of criminal activity. In other words, as criminals get older their 
involvement in crime usually decreases. However, there are certain types of 
criminals, including those who are involved in traditional American Mafia 
organized crime and those who are members of Irish paramilitary organizations, 
who are more likely than ordinary criminals to be committed, on a life-long 
basis, to criminal careers. The leadership of traditional organized crime 
"families" is generally made up of middle-aged men and even some senior 
citizens.30 Many men and women have passed through the ranks of the OIRA 
and PIRA during the past 20 years. Unquestionably, however, there are those 
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within the leadership of the PIRA-Sinn Fein and many who make up the hard-
core rank and file who have been active members of the organization throughout 
most of its history. Some of the more important reasons why many continue to 
remain active within paramilitary organizations have already been discussed. 
The sense of power and the psychological gratification that one receives from 
playing a key role in a subculture or, perhaps for some, in a cause are too much 
to give up for most of those who have little else to fall back on. 
Criminologist Gerald D. Suttles argues that the subcultural theories of 
crime causation are no longer satisfactory when explaining crime within 
America's complex urban areas where there is such a diverse mix of cultures. 
When critiquing Suttles, Robert M. Lombardo does not disagree with such a 
contention, but he does argue that in some urban neighborhoods in America the 
"social structures still support deviant behavior and, in particular, organized 
crime." When discussing the social relationships that develop within what 
Suttles has termed "defended neighborhoods," Lombardo provides some in-
teresting examples of how "structural" support within certain communities "has 
worked against members maturing out of organized criminal activity." While 
this writer obviously believes that the old subcultural theories are still valid 
when explaining crime in Northern Ireland, Lombardo's more restricted so-
ciological approach can help us more clearly understand how criminal organi-
zations are sustained in both Northern Ireland and elsewhere. He provides 
examples of how criminal organizations can thrive even in areas where there is 
more of a mix of cultures than can be found in Northern Ireland's ghettos.31 
Both Suttles and Lombardo have observed how some of the Social and 
Athletic Clubs (SACs) in the Addams section of Chicago help carry on 
("criminal") traditions, integrate age groups, and recruit new members into the 
"Outfit", Chicago's Cosa Nostrafamily. The SACs, which were formerly linked 
to street gangs, currently include members who belong to the "Outfit." These 
members serve as role models, if not folk heroes, and, as such, are able to pass 
on criminal traditions. Undoubtedly, such individuals get a great deal of 
psychological gratification from the respect and admiration they receive from 
their fellow members—not unlike the gratification the above mentioned Sinn 
Fein Counselor seems to receive when cavorting with his cronies in a Provo bar. 
The SACs in Chicago provide the same type of psychological haven for 
members of the "Outfit" as the social and drinking clubs in West Belfast and 
their counterparts in the Protestant Shankill area do for staunch Republicans and 
Loyalists. Such gathering places also serve the purpose of keeping individuals 
in the neighborhoods where they enjoy the most support. "Fat Tony" Salerno 
and John Gotti, the latest "Mob Star" in the United States, may be millionaires, 
but they still return to their rather dingy headquarters and/or social clubs in 
working-class areas on a daily basis.32 Likewise, PIRA supremos can be found 
in similar haunts in the middle of the neighborhoods where they receive the most 
respect and recognition. By remaining in the communities in which they grew 
up, they strengthen the defensive subcultures on which they rely for support. 
If the paramilitary racketeers are making so much money, some ask, why 
don't they move out into some of the "better" areas? Certainly some have left 
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their old neighborhoods. A few, who at least operate on the fringes of the PIRA, 
particularly those associated with the legal profession, now reside in the 
exclusive Malone Road area of Belfast. Undoubtedly, such individuals have 
helped establish the links to the "semi-legitimate world" mat Cloward and Ohlin 
claim are essential to the maintenance of a "criminal" subculture. Others, some 
with no visible means of support, have moved into the middle-class neighborhoods 
of Fruit Hill Park and Glengoland (as is evident from the number of Republican 
Black Taxis in the driveways) to form what amounts to be colonies of PIRA 
supporters. 
However, most of those who are involved in the paramilitary organizations 
would seemingly rather remain in their old neighborhoods. Moving out of their 
patch into up-scale areas may make such individuals not only physically but 
psychologically vulnerable. A life-long resident of the Catholic ghettos explains: 
What I'm saying is they're low class men. Guys like [he names 
four men whom he claims are top Provos] were all notorious 
since the early 70s. They hang out in their own clubs where they 
are all notorious and famous—where they can play their part. 
Their egos wouldn't allow them to hang out elsewhere. They 
hang out where their drinks are free-drinks are set up. They can 
drink after hours if they like. They can get a free taxi home and 
wallow in what they have achieved in West Belfast. A Provisional 
IRA guy I know bought a nice house—60,000 pounds—but it 
was no good to him. He was a nobody. He moved into a place 
called Murray Lake in the early 1970s. He couldn't handle it. 
There was nobody looking up to him. There was nobody. He 
couldn't mix with decent people. It would remind him of what 
he really was. It's all right when you live smack in the middle of 
a ghetto. When you shoot somebody you are a hero. You're 
bullying somebody. You're doing damage. It'sokay. Whenyou 
step outside your patch you become a nobody over night. 
There is little hope that law enforcement officials will ever be able to 
penetrate Northern Ireland's defensive subcultures and gain me confidence and 
cooperation of ghetto residents. Of the many who feel that they are being 
exploited by the paramilitary racketeers, few are prepared to violate the 
subcultural code of conduct which prohibits such cooperation. By doing so they 
would risk losing the security which, if nothing else, the defensive subcultures 
provide them with. 
Research conducted by John Darby clearly demonstrates how the 
defensive subcultures do, in fact, provide a sense of security to those who 
participate in them. This would be the case even if the paramilitaries were not 
consciously attempting to maintain control over the social and economic life of 
the ghettos. Darby analyzed the functions mat certain neighborhoods, which he 
refers to as "heartlands", perform for those who live in them and the obstacles 
that they pose to reconciliation between the two religious and cultural traditions. 
The "heartlands" are the most socially polarized areas in Northern Ireland. 
Residents are almost completely isolated from those of the other tradition and 
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in many ways alienated from the larger society in general. Many of the families 
who live in the "heartlands" moved there to escape from the intimidation and 
sectarian violence that had escalated dramatically in their old neighborhoods 
during the late 1960s and early 70s. As a result, Darby points out, the 
"heartlands" became strengthened. When Catholics and Protestants gravitated 
toward the relative safety of their respective "heartlands", conflict and misun-
derstanding did arise between long-time residents and the newcomers. How-
ever, contact and, therefore, conflict between Catholics and Protestants became 
less frequent. Individuals on both sides of the divide began to identify more than 
ever with those of the same religious and cultural backgrounds. 
Darby concludes that the people who live in these areas now have no real 
interest in changing the status quo. "Compromise", or, in other words, 
attempting to establish peaceful relationships with people from the other 
tradition, is not on their agendas. They are willing to tolerate the current level 
of hostilities that are being carried on between the two communities, but they are 
not prepared to interact with those on the other side on a regular basis again. Both 
Catholics and Protestants remember only too well the threats and violence that 
they had to endure in the past. Such turmoil, they seem to think, could easily flare 
up again if they established closer contacts with each other and, therefore, 
attempts at reconciliation are simply not worth it.32 
HISTORICAL TRADITION: 
ANOTÉER OBSTACLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The current armed conflict in Northern Ireland began two decades ago. 
However, certain traditions that most certainly have contributed to the develop-
ment as well as the nature of modern terrorist organizations were established 
well over 200 years ago. Before delving into Irish history, however, a word of 
caution is in order. It would be a mistake to read too much into the historical 
evidence that is currently available. Therefore, it should be understood that 
these remarks are based only on (hopefully) common sense logic and are 
presented primarily for the purpose of suggesting future research. 
It has been shown that Mafia criminal organizations in North America 
and the subcultures that support them are in some ways similar to those that exist 
in Northern Ireland. This article has attempted to explain why some of these 
organizations and subcultures which are so far removed from each other 
geographically and culturally have so much in common. When attempting to 
account for such similarities, one should also consider the fact that powerful 
"secret societies" have influenced the historical development of both Italy and 
Ireland. 
Those who are at all interested in Italian organized crime and/or the 
history of Italy and Sicily before unification with Italy took place, are well aware 
of the impact that sinister secret societies had on Italian and Sicilian political and 
social development. In a somewhat similar fashion (and the word somewhat 
should be emphasized), past secret societies in Ireland have influenced the 
course of Irish history as well as the nature of modern paramilitary organiza-
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tions. Even those readers who know a great deal about the emergence and 
growth of Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organizations in Northern 
Ireland since 1969 and the activities of the old IRA during the early 20th century 
may not be familiar with other Irish societies, particularly those mat date as far 
back as the 18th century. Unlike the old IRA and the Provisional IRA of today, 
most of the older secret societies could not be accurately labeled as being truly 
revolutionary or even nationalistic. They were generally organizations that 
were formed by working-class men for the purpose of retaliating against rich 
landowners and others whom they felt had done them wrong. While the leaders 
of the early secret societies were more concerned with local grievances than with 
anything else, and were not usually intent on overthrowing the existing govern-
ment, they may well have passed on many traditions that partially account for 
the organizational structure of and methods employed by modern organizations, 
as well as a rationale for using such methods. 
The Whiteboys was such an organization. This secret society became 
known as the Whiteboys because of the white shirts that its members wore over 
their regular clothes when they assembled at night. They were also known as the 
Levellers. The first recorded violent action taken by the organization occurred 
in 1761. Theirvictims were usually members of the upper classes, particularly 
absentee landlords and their stewards in Ireland who had enclosed (fenced in) 
land that small farmers believed should have been used for public grazing of 
livestock. Also, the rates charged for tithes of com and potatoes often incensed 
the Whiteboys and resulted in their retaliating violenüy against the rich and 
powerful. They concentrated primarily on tearing down, thus the alternative 
name of Levellers, the fences and homes of the landlords and their representa-
tives as well as their deer parks, orchards and other "pleasure parks" that, as far 
as the Whiteboys were concerned, should have been open for public grazing.34 
From reading James S. Donnelly Jr's analysis of the history of the 
Whiteboy movement, one can develop a fairly clear picture of the organizational 
structure of the Whiteboys and the methods that they used to maintain solidarity 
and accomplish their goals. While Donnelly does not compare the Whiteboys 
with modern paramilitary organizations, it is obvious from his research that they 
exhibited most of the same characteristics that the modern, particularly Repub-
lican, organizations do. While certainly less ideological in nature and far from 
being guerrilla-type armies, modem Italian criminal organizations also have 
much in common with this early Irish secret society. 
The Whiteboy movement was, as is Irish Republicanism today, firmly 
rooted in the lower social class. The organization's membership was made up 
mostly of small farmers, journeymen, weavers, and artisans. Just as current 
Republican leaders do, the Whiteboys identified themselves as the defenders of 
and spokesmen for the poor. It is of interest to note that some contemporary 
Protestants contended, with little in the way of evidence to support their claims, 
that a number of rich Catholics were Whiteboys. In fact, only one Catholic 
"gentleman," a woolen manufacturer, was directly linked to the movement, and 
he was acquitted when formal charges were brought against him.35 Such ac-
cusations are quite similar to those made by some modern journalists who, also 
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offering no real proof to support their contentions, envision a mysterious 
"second tier" of wealthy Catholic businessmen who are financing the PIRA. 
The organizational structure of the Whiteboys was also quite similar to 
that of the modern paramilitaries. Like the current organizations do, the 
Whiteboys established a permanent hierarchical chain of command and divided 
the membership into various military ranks. As today's "volunteers" are, the 
Whiteboys were required to take oaths, and in doing so not only swear allegiance 
to their organization but to obligate themselves to abide by the formal rules and 
regulations that were set forth in the oaths. 
Like the masterminds behind the modem organizations have, the leaders 
of the Whiteboys demonstrated impressive organizational skills and created a 
durable movement which rapidly spread well beyond a few rural villages and 
towns. According to Donnelly, "But even if oath-bound popular organizations 
did exist on at least a local scale before the early 1760s, the Whiteboys should 
be considered innovators because they invested oaths with great practical and 
symbolic importance in fusing local activity into a wider network of regional 
movement."36 
Reportedly the Whiteboys even required those who were not actual 
members of their organization but were of the same social class to swear oaths 
of loyalty to them or run the risk of being buried alive. They also adopted the 
practice of issuing warnings to those whose behavior they disapproved of 
through letters and public notices.37 Both Republicans and Loyalists employ this 
same method of intimidation today and appear to be well aware of the historical 
precedent for doing so. For example, not long ago in County Deny, a bank 
started foreclosure proceedings on the property of a Catholic businessman 
because he was no longer able to make mortgage payments. Through notices in 
the local newspaper, the PIRA issued threats against bank employees, using the 
rationale that the great landowners of the past had also used foreclosure as a 
means to harass Catholics. As defenders of the people, so they claimed, the 
Provos could no longer tolerate such discriminatory practices. Not unexpect-
edly, bank officials, fearing for their lives, abandoned their efforts to seize the 
man's property. 
The publications produced by both the Loyalist and Republican organi-
zations frequently make reference to injustices of the past and equate the threats 
made and violent action taken by the paramilitaries against their enemies with 
those of patriotic organizations of years ago. By relying on historical precedent, 
they have often attempted to justify behavior that is, indeed, outrageous by most 
people's standards.38 
CONCLUSION 
Lombardo and Suttles argue that social polarization is a fact of urban life. 
Certainly the religious and cultural differences between Catholics and Protes-
tants in Northern Ireland accounted for a high degree of polarization prior to the 
late 1960s. Today, however, heavily armed paramilitary organizations and in 
some instances "peace walls," that remind one of the wall that used to separate 
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the two Berlins, create a level of polarization that is much greater than any that 
would occur naturally. As Darby's research findings clearly demonstrate, 
polarization in Northern Ireland provides a sense of security to the residents of 
those religiously and culturally homogeneous neighborhoods that he refers to as 
the "heartlands." Those who fled to the "heartlands" did so in order to distance 
themselves from the intimidation and violence that threatened their security in 
the old neighborhoods where they lived in closer proximity to those who 
belonged to the "other tradition." To the inhabitants of the "heartlands", the 
prospect of returning to a more religiously integrated neighborhood or of even 
having contact with the other side has no appeal. 
The defensive subcultures that have developed within the ghettos have 
created near ideal conditions for some who want to carry on certain Irish 
traditions, such as organizing and maintaining secret societies. The passage of 
the new legislation and the stepped-up efforts on the part of law enforcement 
authorities may result in significant new victories in the fight against racketeering. 
It should also be noted that despite all the obstacles that face Anti-Racketeering 
Squad detectives, they continue to demonstrate their professionalism and 
tenacity when going after the racketeers. Nevertheless, those who investigate 
organized crime have no control over the social conditions that exist in Northern 
Ireland. Certain facts of life will not change in die foreseeable future. In the eyes 
of many, those neighborhoods that are "protected" by the paramilitaries have 
become nothing more than "thugdoms" that are controlled by gangster-led 
secret societies whose leaders have perverted patriotic traditions in order to 
further their own interests. While this may or may not be an accurate assessment 
of what has taken place over the last 21 years, the fact remains that the defensive 
subcultures within the "heartlands" have, indeed, been strengthened and will 
continue to provide havens in which the racketeer and terrorist can operate in 
relative safety. 
Endnotes 
1. This article is based on information that was gathered by the author during his five-year, 
on-going study of the involvement of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary ("terrorist") 
organizations in racketeering activity. The author's interest in the involvement of 
paramilitary organizations in racketeering was first aroused when two contacts, both 
former high-ranking members of the PIRA, independently attempted to convince him that 
the organization to which they devoted much of their lives had, in fact, become, in the 
words of one, a "mafia". That one insisted that the current "supremos" were virtually all 
"racketeers." While the second ex-Provo felt that the majority of today's leaders were 
"probably" still dedicated to "the cause," at least a sizable minority had lost all sense of 
ideology and were more interested in exploiting the residents of the Catholic ghettos than 
in helping them. At the present time, the author"s research involves interviewing victims 
of the paramilitary extortionists. The author's sources come from differing walks of life 
and include representatives from all of the major paramilitary organizations and their 
political wings. He has conducted his research primarily in the Belfast area (usually in 
May and/or June of each year) and, in a much more limited way, in Deny (during May and 
June of 1988 and 1989) and in Strabane where he spent a very short period of time (two 
days) conducting several in-depth inquiries with Republican activists about their alleged 
47 
Fall 1990 
involvement in racketeering. The author is particularly indebted to the detectives who 
make up C-13 (the Anti-Racketeering Squad of the Royal Ulster Constabulary), including 
the last three Detective Superintendents in charge of that unit, for making themselves 
available for interviews and supplying him with relevant information. 
A few sources are directly quoted in this article. The first quotes come from interviews 
that were conducted separately with two former high-ranking members of the Provisional 
IRA. The first man who is quoted has been an acquaintance of the author for approxi-
mately six years, and the second has known the author for three years. Comments 
concerning the second individual are based on taped interviews that took place in May 
1988 and June 1990. 
Access to some of the other sources who are quoted could not have been gained without 
the assistance of a Sinn Fein (the political wing of the PIRA) Counselor (who asked not 
to be identified) and a probation officer (who, for his own protection, should also remain 
anonymous). These sources were the "Hoods" (semi-organized street criminals) that the 
author interviewed in Turf Lodge, a Catholic ghetto in West Belfast, during May 1989 and 
the young PIRA supporters who were interviewed in Twinbrook, another Catholic ghetto, 
in May 1988. Two residents of the Catholic Short Strand area of Belfast are also quoted. 
The author also made reference to a former Catholic pub owner by the name of Jim 
Murtagh. Murtagh was the first to testify in open court against paramilitary extortionists. 
He has survived several assassination attempts and now lives under an assumed name in 
a secret location. As he has been for the last two years, Murtagh continues to be a valuable 
source of information and contacts for the author. 
While the following brief list of publications is not intended to be exhaustive, it should 
provide the reader with some helpful sources of information on both the conflict in general 
and the paramilitary organizations that are involved in it. 
2. Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery, Northern Ireland Since 1968 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1988), pp. 6-11,37,64. 
3. Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: William Heinmann, 
1987), pp. 34-42,89-105. 
4. See Paul K. Clare, Racketeering in Northern Ireland: A New Version of the Patriot Game 
(Chicago: OICJ Books, University oflllinois at Chicago, 1989)pp. 16-23. Also see Fintan 
Cronin, "Swindlers Bankroll Workers' Party: The Official IRA is alive, armed, and on 
the fiddle," Irish Independent, 20 August 1987; Fergal Keane, "Behind the Image," The 
Sunday Tribune (Dublin) 28 December 1986; Fergal Keane, "Old Soldiers Never Die," 
The Sunday Tribune, 4 January 1987: "Counterfeit plates at Workers' Party HQ," The 
Sunday Tribune, 28 December 1986; "Worse than the Mafia," The Cook Report (Bir-
mingham: Central Television, 19 August 1987) and "The Patriot Game (Dublin: Radio 
Telefis Eireann, 1986). RTE is the television network of the Republic of Ireland. 
5. See Sinn Fein Policy Document which is available at Sinn Fein advice centers throughout 
Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. On the evolution of Sinn Fein's political 
orientation in the 1980s and its implications, see Henry Patterson, "Gerry Adams and the 
Modernisation of Republicanism", Conflict Quarterly, 10, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-
23. 
6. Michael O'Higgins, "The INLA Devours Itself, Magill, 10, no. 7 (March 1987), pp. 16-
26. 
7. On the Protestant extremist groups, see Sarah Nelson, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: 
Loyalist and the Northern Ireland Conflict (Belfast: The Appletree Press, 1984); see also 
Keith Maguire, "Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland," Armed Forces, (October 1988), 
pp. 465-71. 
8. Martin Dillon, The Dirty War (London: Hutchinson, 1988), p. 418. 
9. Ibid., p. 419. 
48 
Conflict Quarterly 
10. In the opinion of this author, however, it would be a mistake to regard the brewers as being 
true victims of the Republican extortionists. The brewers continue to do business in the 
paramilitary-controlled areas because they are profiting from the lucrative markets within 
these neighborhoods. It is worth noting that the construction of the two newest PIRA-Sinn 
Fein and OIRA-Workers' Party drinking and social clubs was financed, in part, from loans 
from British and Irish breweries. 
11. Dillon, The Dirty War, p. 420. 
12. Jim Cusack, "RUC gets powers similar to US anti-Mafia laws "The Irish Times, 23 March 
1989, p. 7. 
13. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (Title IX of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970). 
11. For some time now, various underground sources have been providing the Official IRA, 
as well as other organizations, with false tax exemption certificates. The tax exemption 
racket works as follows: the tax rate, if a sub-contractor on a building site does not have 
a tax exemption, is 33%. The main contractor, acting on behalf of Inland Revenue (the 
British government's tax enforcement agency) is required to hold back one third of the 
contract price. Therefore, if a sub-contractor completes the requirements of a 9,000 pound 
contract, for example, and he does not have a tax exemption certificate, he only receives 
6,000 pounds. The main contractor keeps 3,000 pounds and sends it to Inland Revenue. 
The racket occurs when the OIRA, or some other organization, provides the sub-
contractor with a false certificate and he presents it to the main contractor. After 
examining the apparently legitimate document, the main contractor pays the sub-
contractor the full 9,000 pounds. The OIRA usually charges the sub-contractor ten % for 
the use of the false certificate. The ten %, or most of it, goes into the coffers of the OIRA, 
and the sub-contractor makes 8,100 pounds rather than the 6,000 that he would normally 
receive. 
15. Maguire, p. 469. Maguire describes the circumstances leading up to McMichael's murder, 
but does not attribute it to UDA-PIRA collusion. 
16. Statistics analyzed by INTERPOL indicate that the "risk factor" for Northern Ireland was 
twice as high as in El Salvador, the second most dangerous place in which to do police 
work. See Chris Ryder, The RUC: A Force Under Fire (London: Methuen, 1989), p. 2. 
17. Red diesel is a very cheap fuel that is used for agricultural purposes. Large amounts of 
the fuel are obtained by die PIRA and treated with a chemical to remove the red dye. It 
is then sold as dealer fuel for, reportedly, as much as double that of its original price. Since 
October 1989 the RUC has been involved in two major investigations of the racket. 
18. There is no conclusive evidence that links McGlinchey directly to the killings. See 
O'Higgins, pp. 24-25. 
19. Claie,RacketeeringinNorthernIreland. Also see James Adaias,The Financing ofTerror 
(Great Britain: New English Library, 1988), pp. 197-228. 
20. Fortnight, No. 273, (May 1989), p. 8. 
21. Ibid 
22. Richard A. Qoward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity (New York: The 
Free Press, 1960). 
23. A more primitive type in which relatively recent migrants or immigrants to the most 
socially disorganized sections of the city attain status by demonstrating their ability to 
"defend their turf," fight courageously, and endure pain. 
24. The "retreatist" subculture is made up of drug addicts, alcoholics, street people, and other 
dropouts. 




26. James F. Short, Ray A. Tennyson, and Kenneth I. Howard, "Behavior Dimensions in Gang 
Delinquency," American Sociological Review, 28, (1963), pp. 411-428. 
27. John Darby, Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1986), passim. 
28. For an analysis of this problem from the perspective of a professional social worker, see 
Vincent McCarthy, "Social Work in Northern Ireland: Professional or Political", Master 
of Social Work Dissertation, Queen's University-Belfast, 1982. 
29. Is the PIRA-Sinn Fein a true Marxist revolutionary organization? Scholars disagree over 
the answer to that question, and I do not believe that it is a question that is relevant to this 
article. Suffice it to say that the Sinn Fein Counselor to whom I am referring identifies 
himself as a Marxist revolutionary but, apparently, has not attempted to preach Marxism 
to his young charges. See Patterson, pp. 7-16, on the influence of leftist thought on Gerry 
Adams and on Provisional Sinn Fein. 
30. See Robert M. Lombardo, "Criminal Careers and Organized Crime," Criminal Organi-
zations, 4 (1989), p. 3. 
31. Ibid., pp. 3-6. Also see Gerald D. Suttles, The Social Order of the Slum (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
32. Gene Mustain and Jerry Capeci.Moft Star: The Story ofJohn Gom'(Franklin Watts, 1988). 
33. Darby, Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland. 
34. James S. Donnelly Jr., "The Whiteboy movement, 1761-5," Irish Historical Studies, XXI 
(1978-79), pp. 20-54. 
35. Ibid., p. 43. 
36. Ibid., p. 37. 
37. Ibid. 
38. On the PIRA's use of history to justify its campaign, see Joanne Wright, "PIRA 
Propaganda: the Constructional Legitimàcy,"ConflictQuarterly,lO,ao. 3 (Summer 1990), 
pp. 24-41. 
50 
